National Tabletop Exercise on Deliberate Release of HPAI into Kenya Strengthens One Health Preparedness and Biological Threat Response Capacity.

High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza remains one of the world’s most significant transboundary animal diseases due to its impact on poultry production, food systems, trade, livelihoods, biodiversity, and public health. According to WOAH and the World Health Organization (WHO), outbreaks of avian influenza viruses continue to pose a serious global concern due to their zoonotic potential and capacity to disrupt national economies and food supply systems. The increasing complexity of biological threats has further reinforced the need for countries to strengthen preparedness, emergency coordination, surveillance systems, and multisectoral response mechanisms.

The exercise formed part of WOAH’s broader efforts to strengthen institutional resilience against biological threats and support its Members in improving preparedness for animal health emergencies, zoonotic diseases, and deliberate biological incidents.

He explained that WOAH Members are required to report confirmed outbreaks of listed diseases through the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS) within 24 hours, supporting rapid international information sharing and coordinated disease response. He further noted that WOAH standards and manuals provide scientific guidance on disease diagnosis, surveillance, prevention, and control for both terrestrial and aquatic animal diseases.

Mr Busuulwa also presented the objectives of the FIRABioT Project, which seeks to improve emergency response systems, strengthen institutional resilience against biological threats, and demonstrate the value of animal health institutions as strategic partners within national and global security systems.

He noted that Kenya is among nine African countries benefiting from the project following regional consultations initiated in 2022. Activities implemented under the initiative have included emergency management training, laboratory capacity strengthening, biosecurity initiatives, risk communication workshops, surveillance training, simulation exercise planning, and regional coordination activities.

The objectives of the exercise were to:

• Strengthen national preparedness and emergency response capacity for HPAI outbreaks;
• Assess coordination mechanisms between animal health, public health, security, and emergency response sectors;
• Test surveillance, laboratory diagnosis, outbreak investigation, and reporting systems;
• Review emergency communication and public awareness procedures during disease outbreaks;
• Identify operational gaps and priority areas for strengthening Kenya’s contingency plans and preparedness frameworks.

The opening remarks emphasised that preventing the introduction and spread of HPAI remains a critical national security and public health priority, given the severe socioeconomic, food security, and zoonotic risks posed by this disease. HPAI viruses, especially those of the H5 and H7 subtypes, have demonstrated the capacity for rapid transmission and high mortality among domestic poultry, with significant implications for livelihoods, poultry trade, and the broader agricultural economy.

The morning session provided a comprehensive overview of the global, regional, and national HPAI situation. Dr. Lillian Wambua presented the latest epidemiological data from the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS), revealing a global landscape that has shifted dramatically over the past three epidemic waves.

Her presentation highlighted that the current epidemic wave, spanning October 2025 to September 2026, has already recorded more than 6,000 outbreaks in wild birds—approximately three times the number reported during the previous epidemic wave. At the global level, over 17 million poultry losses have been reported, with the season still ongoing. The Americas remain the most impacted region, accounting for 43% of global losses, followed by Europe with 37%.

For Africa, Dr. Wambua noted that while the continent currently reports only 3% of global outbreaks and 0.2% of global losses, this likely reflects significant under-detection rather than true absence. Notably, 100% of African HPAI events involve the H5N1 subtype. Eleven countries globally have now reported HPAI outbreaks in mammals, including domestic cats, foxes, and various wild carnivore species. No African Member has yet reported mammalian spillover in the current epidemic wave, but the risk remains acute.

Lead facilitator Dr. Sam Okuthe, then introduced four thematic working groups focusing on surveillance, infection prevention and control, case management, and risk communication and coordination.

Dr. Okuthe emphasized that disease preparedness extends beyond veterinary systems alone and requires effective collaboration between public health institutions, laboratories, security agencies, county governments, communication specialists, and emergency response teams operating under the One Health framework.

Dr Sam Okuthe, divided participants into four interdisciplinary teams: surveillance, infection prevention and control (IPC), case management, and risk communication and coordination. The exercise was designed to reveal how Kenya’s national contingency plan performs under pressure.

The surveillance group focused on the outbreak detection systems, epidemiological investigations, tracing mechanisms, and reporting pathways between county and national authorities. Participants reviewed how unusual disease events would be detected, verified, reported, and escalated within Kenya’s animal health surveillance framework.

The infection prevention and control group examined biosafety and biosecurity procedures, quarantine measures, and operational containment strategies aimed at reducing disease transmission risks in both animal and human populations.

The case management group reviewed preparedness systems for handling suspected human infections and examined collaboration mechanisms between veterinary and public health sectors during zoonotic disease emergencies.

The coordination and risk communication group assessed emergency communication systems, coordination structures between county and national governments, and approaches for engaging the public, media, farmers, traders, and other stakeholders during outbreaks.

The afternoon session transitioned into the first two simulation modules. Module 1 introduced the HPAI scenario 1 which involved a growing number of human and animal HPAI (H5N1) cases reported across several continents, with sporadic human infections primarily linked to contact with infected animals. The World Health Organization had issued a Phase 3 pandemic alert, indicating no or very limited human-to-human transmission. No infections had been reported in Kenya at that time. Participants were tasked with initiating notifications, triggering early warning systems, and planning field investigations and rapid risk assessments.

Module 2 escalated to scenario 2 which involved suspected outbreaks of HPAI in multiple commercial poultry farms across Mombasa, Kisumu, and Uasin Gishu counties, characterised by sudden high poultry mortality, respiratory and neurological signs, and severe drops in egg production. Participants were forced to navigate diagnostic confirmation processes, activate emergency operations, and initiate national-level coordination mechanisms. The exercise exposed critical bottlenecks in the speed of communication between national and county governments, as well as between veterinary and public health sectors.

Discussions throughout the day highlighted the importance of rapid information sharing, integrated surveillance systems, laboratory preparedness, and clear communication channels during disease emergencies.

The emergence of suspected human cases fundamentally altered the response dynamics of the exercise, forcing participants to integrate animal health, public health, laboratory, security, and communication systems into a coordinated national response.

Participants examined isolation procedures, infection prevention and control (IPC) measures, contact tracing systems, quarantine enforcement, public communication strategies, and the operational realities of managing a rapidly evolving zoonotic disease emergency.

The simulation later escalated further under Scenario 6, which introduced 109 confirmed human cases distributed across three regions of Kenya, including 5 confirmed fatalities associated with H5N1 infection.

The evolving scenario forced participants to confront the possibility of large-scale national coordination involving emergency financing, surge capacity, hospital preparedness, laboratory response, public communication, and national disaster management systems.

Participants discussed activation of emergency operations systems, deployment of field investigation teams, laboratory confirmation procedures, enforcement of quarantine measures, movement control strategies, and management of public communication during periods of heightened concern.

The role of national security agencies became particularly important during discussions on biosecurity risks, deliberate biological incidents, law enforcement coordination, and enforcement of emergency measures.

Participants also examined the importance of coordinated risk communication during outbreaks. Discussions highlighted how misinformation, fear, and poor communication can undermine response efforts, disrupt trade and livelihoods, and reduce public confidence in response institutions.

The thematic discussions identified several major challenges, including inadequate staffing for contact tracing, weak quarantine enforcement, delays in activation of contingency financing mechanisms, gaps in risk communication systems, and concerns regarding public non-reporting of symptoms due to fear and stigma.

Participants also emphasised the importance of integrating veterinary and public health systems under the One Health framework, particularly given the interconnected nature of zoonotic disease threats.

The role of the Zoonotic Disease Unit (ZDU) and county-level One Health coordination mechanisms was recognised as a major institutional strength that can support joint outbreak investigations, surveillance activities, and coordinated response planning.

The discussions further highlighted the importance of trust, transparency, and timely communication during disease emergencies, particularly in preventing misinformation, panic, and resistance to public health interventions.

The exercise further reinforced the importance of sustained investment in laboratory systems, emergency preparedness planning, disease intelligence systems, workforce development, and multisectoral coordination structures.

Participants reviewed systems for recovery planning, restoration of public confidence, continued surveillance, movement controls, public communication, and long-term preparedness strengthening following outbreak containment.

Dr. Sam Okuthe reflected that the simulation exercise successfully tested Kenya’s contingency plans by challenging participants to examine surveillance systems, laboratory diagnosis capacity, case management structures, coordination mechanisms, and communication systems under pressure.

He emphasized that the purpose of simulation exercises is not to demonstrate perfection, but to identify operational gaps early enough to strengthen systems before real emergencies occur. He further stressed that zoonotic disease threats require sustained multisectoral collaboration involving veterinary services, public health systems, environmental sectors, laboratories, security agencies, and policy makers.

The exercise concluded with closing remarks from participants, facilitators, and representatives from the Directorate of Veterinary Services. Discussions focused on transforming lessons learned during the three-day exercise into practical improvement plans aimed at strengthening preparedness systems, workforce capacity, policy implementation, laboratory systems, emergency coordination, and outbreak response mechanisms.