



Food and Agriculture
Organization of the
United Nations



World Organisation
for Animal Health
Founded as OIE



GF-TADs for Africa
African Swine Fever (ASF)
Standing Group of Experts (SGE)
for Africa
Fourth meeting



15 – 17 October 2024
Online

Table of contents

Table of contents	3
Introduction and background to the meeting.....	7
Objectives and narrative report of the meeting	8
Programme, as delivered (including deletions and <u>additions</u>)	10
Session 1. Welcoming remarks by the Bureau of the Regional Steering Committee	14
Session 2. Governance Aspects and Regional Updates	15
Session 3. Principles and innovations to strengthen capacities for outbreak management at national level	18
Session 4: Strengthen capacities for outbreak management Updates on national ASF preparedness and response programmes	22
Session 5. Final deliberations, action points, next meeting	29
Annex 1. List of participants	31
Annex 2. Resources : international reference laboratories (WOAH) for African swine fever	34
Annex 3. Resources : international reference centres (FAO) for African swine fever	35
Annex 4. Resources : selected national reference laboratories for African swine fever (SGE Members)	35
Annex 5. Resources : latest immediate notifications submitted to WAHIS (since 2018, in reverse chronological order) as of 31 December 2024.....	36

List of tables

Table 1: Outbreak management	9
Table 2: Recommendations by value chain actors for control of ASF and perceptions on applicability (Source: Michel Dione, Dakar-Senegal, ILRI)	24

List of maps

Map 1: Update on African swine fever in the region (2022 – 2024) based on WAHIS database (Source: G. Bazimo WAHIAD, WOA).....	16
Map 2: ASFV genotypes, circulating in Africa. Source : Njau, Emma P., et al. "African swine fever virus (ASFV) : Biology, genomics and genotypes circulating in sub-Saharan Africa." Viruses 13.11 (2021): 2285.....	17
Map 3: Role of transport in the circulation of the ASF virus (Biosecurity), 2021 (Source: Dr Garga Gonne, DSV & Dr Feussom K. Jean-Marc, SDPSE, Cameroon).....	23

List of figures

Figure 1: New ASF Outbreaks reported since 2022 based on WAHIS database (Source: G. Bazimo WAHIAD, WOA).....	16
Figure 2: Description of epidemiological investigation process (Source: Dan Donachie Preparedness and Resilience Department, WOA).....	19
Figure 3: Envisaged Role of Stakeholders in preventing ASF (Source: Dan Donachie Preparedness and Resilience Department, WOA).....	21
Figure 4: Progression of ASFV infection to guide decisions on use of the various diagnostic tests (Source: Livio Heath, ARC-OVRI, South Africa).....	27

Recommended Citation

WOAH and FAO. 2024. *Fourth GF-TADs for Africa meeting of the Standing Group of Experts (SGE) for African swine fever. Report of the online event, 15 – 17 October 2024. Nairobi.*

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) or the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers, whether or not these have been patented, does not imply that these have been endorsed or recommended by FAO or the WOA in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.

The views expressed in this information product are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of FAO or WOA.

© WOA and FAO, 2024



Some rights reserved. This work is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-Share Alike 3.0 IGO licence (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO; <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/igo/legalcode>).

Under the terms of this licence, this work may be copied, redistributed and adapted for non-commercial purposes, provided that the work is appropriately cited. In any use of this work, there should be no suggestion that FAO or WOA endorses any specific organization, products or services. The use of the FAO or WOA logo is not permitted. If the work is adapted, then it must be licensed under the same or equivalent Creative Commons licence. If a translation of this work is created, it must include the following disclaimer along with the required citation: “This translation was not created by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) or the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). FAO and the WOA are not responsible for the content or accuracy of this translation. The original English edition shall be the authoritative edition.”

Disputes arising under the licence that cannot be settled amicably will be resolved by mediation and arbitration as described in Article 8 of the licence except as otherwise provided herein. The applicable mediation rules will be the mediation rules of the World Intellectual Property Organization (<http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/mediation/rules>) and any arbitration will be conducted in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).

Third-party materials. Users wishing to reuse material from this work that is attributed to a third party, such as tables, figures or images, are responsible for determining whether permission is needed for that reuse and for obtaining permission from the copyright holder. The risk of claims resulting from infringement of any third-party-owned component in the work rests solely with the user.

Sales, rights and licensing. FAO information products are available on the FAO website (www.fao.org/publications) and can be purchased through publications-sales@fao.org. Requests for commercial use should be submitted via: www.fao.org/contact-us/licence-request. Queries regarding rights and licensing should be submitted to: copyright@fao.org.

Publications of the World Organisation for Animal Health are available either on the WOA website (woah.org) or can be purchased through the WOA online bookshop (woah.org/en/ebookshop/).

Introduction and background to the meeting

The situation of *African swine fever* (ASF) has become of increasing concern, not only in Africa where it originated, but globally. Indeed, beyond Africa, despite the best prevention and control efforts, ASF continues to persist in domestic and wild pig populations. Being a transboundary animal disease, ASF poses a serious negative impact on production and productivity, therefore affecting national economies and social structures of the pig producing countries.

The *Standing Group of Experts* (SGE) for *African swine fever* (ASF) was established in March 2022, following its approval by the 11th Africa Regional Steering Committee (RSC) of the Global Framework for the progressive control of Transboundary Animals Diseases (GF-TADs) in October 2021. The SGE is comprised of the founding member countries (*Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Togo, Uganda and Cabo Verde*) that have reported ASF. Mali was invited as an observer during SGE III and IV, pending validation by the Regional Steering Committee.

The first meeting of the SGE ASF (held in March 2022) endorsed a workplan of topics that should be addressed by the SGE ASF in the coming months.

The second meeting which was the first thematic (but the second meeting of the SGE) was dedicated to understanding the live pig and pork value chains in Africa while the third meeting discussed biosecurity along the value chains, as well as surveillance, including diagnosis.

This present, fourth meeting was planned to discuss outbreak management, reflecting on capacities for outbreak response, existing national capacities and alternative innovative solutions applicable for the region.

Objectives and narrative report of the meeting

The fourth meeting of the SGE ASF for Africa was organised by the WOAHA Regional Representation for Africa, in its capacity as the Secretariat of the GF-TADs for Africa RSC, with the support of the FAO, AU-IBAR and the GF-TADs ASF Working Group.

The meeting was held as an online meeting i.e. through video conference (Zoom platform) from 15 to 17 October 2024.

The meeting was attended by 9 out of 10 member countries, i.e. Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Togo and Uganda. Mali did not attend.

Also present were the African Union's *Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources* (IBAR) and the Pan-African Veterinary *Vaccines Centre* (PANVAC), as well as FAO and WOAHA Regional Representations headquarter staff, the *International Livestock Research Institute*, and two selected national reference laboratories: the *National Veterinary Research Institute* (NVRI), Vom, Nigeria, the Senegalese Institute of Agricultural Research (ISRA) in Dakar-Hann, Senegal and the Joint FAO – IAEA Division, Vienna, Austria.

Also present was the *Onderstepoort Veterinary Research Institute* (OVRI, ARC), both a WOAHA Reference Laboratory for ASF, WOAHA Collaborating Centre and FAO Reference Centre for ASF (South Africa).

In addition to a presentation made by Eswatini, as Chair of the Epidemiology and Informatics Subcommittee of the SADC *Livestock Technical Committee (LTC)*, the *Regional Economic Communities (REC)* who attended the meeting were: the *Inter-Governmental Authority of Development* (IGAD, covering the Horn of Africa) through the *IGAD Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development*, the Regional Animal Health Centre for Central Africa (RAHC-CA) of the *Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC)*, and the Regional Animal Health Centre for West Africa (RAHC-WA) of the *Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)*.

Other Members, Observers and Experts who participated in the meeting were from University of Pretoria, Onderstepoort, the *Vietnam National University of Agriculture*, Hanoi and the President of the WOAHA Biological Standards Commission, Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire.

Overall, the meeting was attended by an average of 35 participants per session (46 unique participants in total), whilst 60 participants overall registered for the event. Only 11 percent (18 %) out of these 60 participants were women. The list of participants is presented as **annex 2**.

Based on the agreed workplan, adopted at the first SGE meeting in March 2022, the following agenda covering the topic on outbreak management (as outlined in the inaugural meeting) was prepared, fostering as much exchange of information and discussion between participants as possible, following a few technical orientation presentations and discussions.

Table 1: Outbreak management

Outbreak management	Outbreak response capability and capacity for ASF control	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Training on 3Ds (depopulation, disposal, decontamination);• Financial incentives such as compensation of farmers, restocking and insurance schemes;• <i>Compensation plans (CP)</i> as part of emergency preparedness and response plans;• Risk communication (awareness in producers and actors in value chain).
----------------------------	--	--

Programme, as delivered (including deletions and additions)

Fourth Meeting of the Standing Group of Experts (SGE) on African swine fever (ASF) of the GF-TADs for Africa


Topic : *ASF outbreak management*

Online


Programme

15 – 17 October 2024

Tuesday 15 October 2024 (all times are in GMT)		
08:30 – 09:00	Check-in of participants, house-keeping rules (Zoom), disclaimers, troubleshooting, setting up the interpretation channels	
Session 1. Welcoming remarks by the Bureau of the Regional Steering Committee		
09:00 – 09:15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • African Union - IBAR • Food and Agriculture Organisation • World Organisation for Animal Health 	Huyam Salih, President Mohammed Shamsuddin, Roland Xolani Dlamini, ———— Vice Presidents <u>Karim Tounkara</u>
09:15 – 09:20	Adoption of the agenda Objectives and expected outputs of the meeting	Karim Tounkara, Secretary of the GF-TADs for Africa, WOA, Bamako
Session 2. Governance aspects and regional updates		Facilitator: Mohammed Shamsuddin 
09:20 – 09:40	Minutes of the 3 rd SGE meeting, Action points and status of implementation of recommendations from the 3 rd SGE	Viola Chemis, Regional Activities Department, WOA, Nairobi
09:40 – 09:50	Outcomes of ASF GCC (2024) and reflections for Africa region	Charmaine Chng, Science Department, WOA, Paris
09:50 – 10:00	Regional updates on the current disease situation: ASF disease situation based on WAHIS reporting	Gregorie Bazimo, World Animal Health Information and Analysis Department, WOA, Paris
10:00 – 10:30	ASF control, coordination and network interventions at sub-regional level <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Eastern Africa • Southern Africa • Central Africa 	Y. Wogayehu (Ethiopia), IGAD – EAREN Sihle Mdluli (Eswatini) SADC LTC – EISC Patchili Bouzabo, RAHC-CA (ECCAS)

Session 3. National updates and opportunities to strengthen capacities for outbreak management 		
Facilitator: Karim Tounkara		
10:30 – 10:40	WOAH Standards on general disease outbreak management	Dan Donachie, Preparedness and Resilience Department, WOAH, Paris
10:40 – 11:00	Principles and innovations for managing ASF covering the different pig production systems <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Depopulation, partial culling, disposal and decontamination • Quarantine, movement control • Financial incentives • Risk communication 	Mary-Louise Penrith, University of Pretoria, South Africa
11:00 – 11:20	Partial culling: new approach for disease control	Le Van Phan, Vietnam National University of Agriculture, Vietnam
11:20 – 11:40	Modified stamping out during outbreak management	Hiver Boussini, AU- IBAR, Nairobi
11:40 – 12:00	Discussion and day closing	<u>Facilitator</u> : Karim Tounkara


Wednesday 16 October 2024 (all times are in GMT)

08:30 – 09:00	Check-in of participants	
Session 3. National updates and opportunities to strengthen capacities for outbreak management (continued) 		
Chair: Huyam Salih		
09:00 – 09:30	Member country experiences on outbreak management <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • South Africa • Mali • Cameroon 	Country Representative
09:30 – 09:50	Discussion, Q & A on country presentations	<u>Facilitator</u> : Hiver Boussini
09:50 – 10:10	Challenges and solutions for community engagement in outbreak management: experiences from West, Central and East Africa	Michel Dione, ILRI, Dakar Fasina Folorunso, FAO, Rome
10:10 – 10:40	Member country experiences on outbreak management <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Togo • Uganda • Nigeria 	Country Representative
10:40 – 11:00	Discussion, Q & A on country presentations	<u>Facilitator</u> : Mary-Louise Penrith

11:00 – 11:20	Challenges and solutions for early disease detection of ASF, reporting and control of ASF in resource limited settings	Fredrick Kivaria/Casimir Ndonge, FAO Sub-regional Office, Nairobi/ HQ, Rome
11:20 – 11:40	Innovations on outbreak management in resource constrained settings— carcass disposal, decontamination, mobile slaughter units (in Uganda)	Emily Ouma, ILRI, Kampala
11:40 – 12:00	Discussion: innovations and solutions for improved outbreak management in resource limited settings	Facilitator: Roland Dlamini, Director of Livestock and Veterinary Services, Eswatini

Thursday 17 October 2024 (all times are in GMT)

08:30 – 09:00	Check-in of participants	
Session 4. Strengthen capacities for outbreak management – Updates on national ASF preparedness and response programmes		Chair: Emmanuel Couacy-Hymann 
09:00 – 09:30	Country Presentations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cabo Verde • Democratic Republic of Congo • Kenya 	Country Representatives
09:30 – 09:50	Discussion on country presentations, Q&A	Facilitator: Charles Masembe, Makerere University, Uganda
09:50 – 10:10	Financial incentives to support farmers post-outbreak (compensation of farmers, restocking and insurance schemes) The case of Cote d' Ivoire	Charles Emmanuel Yacé, Interprofession porcine de Côte d'Ivoire (Interporci), Vessaly Kallo, CVO and WOAHA Delegate, Douyeri Thierry Ouattara, Cote d'ivoire
10:10 – 10:20	Promoting evidence based ASF control policies - compensation, restocking, etc	Mary-Louise Penrith, University of Pretoria, South Africa
10:20 – 10:30	Promoting effective surveillance and diagnostics: point of care, rapid testing in field practice, lessons learnt and improving access to diagnostics	Livio Heath, ARC - OVRI, South Africa
10:30 – 10:40	Promoting access to ASF diagnostics, example of mobile diagnostic units in use in Tanzania	Fredrick Kivaria, ECTAD Sub-regional Office, FAO, Nairobi

10:40 – 11:00	Risk communication, behavioural change, strategies to raise awareness amongst producers and actors in the value chain and enhance uptake of best practices in ASF control	Cortney Price, Lead for Behavioural Science, FAO, Rome Domingo (Jim) Caro III, Development Communications, Risk Communication, Stakeholder Engagement, Communication Evaluation & Social Media, FAO, Rome
11:00 – 11:40	Plenary Discussion / break out groups (2): what are the incentives for compliance with outbreak management policies (quarantine, movement control, partial culling, disposal, decontamination and timely reporting)	Lead facilitators: French : Michel Dione, ILRI, Dakar English : Charles Masembe, Makerere University, Uganda
11:40 – 12:00	Group restitution and summary of action items for prioritization by different actors/members of SGE/MS	Facilitator: Mary-Louise Penrith, University of Pretoria, South Africa
Session 6. Final deliberations, action points, closing		
Circulated by email	Presentation of the draft action points	Rapporteurs
Circulated by email	Proposed amendments to the Terms of Reference and to the list of technical items (<i>Review technical topics for next SGEs 2025-2026, Membership</i>)	Patrick Bastiaensen, Sub-Regional Representation for Eastern Africa, WOAHA, Nairobi

This meeting was organised under the auspices of the



Session 1. Welcoming remarks by the Bureau of the Regional Steering Committee

The opening remarks were delivered by Dr. Huyam Salih, the Director of AU-IBAR and President of the Regional Steering Committee of the GF-TADs for Africa, Dr. Mohammed Shamsuddin on behalf of FAO and Dr. Karim Tounkara of WOAHA on behalf of Roland Dlamini in their capacities as the Vice-Presidents of the GF-TADs for Africa. Dr. Huyam recognised the presence of the leadership of GF-TADs for Africa represented by FAO, WOAHA and the SGE Members and Experts in the meeting. She stressed the importance of ASF in the region considering the presence of the sylvatic cycle, limited veterinary infrastructure and capacities for surveillance among other factors straining the effective control of the disease. In her submission, she proposed that the



efforts should focus on enhanced biosecurity to minimize outbreaks and continued investment in vaccine research. She recognised the collaboration by all partners with AU-IBAR to support SGE Members and the importance of this meeting for sharing knowledge and best practices.

Speech by Dr. Huyam Salih, Director of AU-IBAR, Chair of the GF-TADs Africa Regional Steering Committee

Dr. Shamsuddin on behalf of FAO recognised the presence of the leadership of GF-TADs, Members and Experts in the meeting. He emphasised the importance of the meeting to update on the regional status, take stock of progress made and discuss the way forward. He re-iterated that biosecurity remains the most proven tool to control ASF and other diseases despite the constraints of implementation in low input production systems and considering the wildlife interaction. He proposed this importance to reflect and discuss how to increase acceptance of biosecurity practices by livestock-owning communities. This includes review and implementation of supportive legislation, taking cognisance of community-based approaches. He further informed the meeting of FAO interventions in Cabo Verde to pilot biosecurity in resource limited settings and interventions in Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Kenya through the *Technical Cooperation Projects (TCP)* in partnership with AU-IBAR. He reminded the meeting of actions from previous SGEs that identified building importance of improving Early Warning Systems through support for laboratory capacity, with enhanced sample flow from the field to the laboratory.

Dr Tounkara on behalf of WOAHA recognised the leadership, WOAHA Delegates, Members of the SGE and Experts. He extended regards from the WOAHA Director General, Emmanuelle Soubeyran. Dr. Tounkara reminded the meeting that the region is ready to control ASF and the reports of Veterinary Services in managing outbreaks are important to control the impact of the disease. He appreciated the Experts for investing time in the SGE to share their experiences and expertise for better pig health and production. He stated the importance of taking stock of the progress, and noting that eradication may not be possible due to the epidemiology of the disease in the region, he added his voice to the need to identify key actions to progress and advance control efforts.

Session 2. Governance Aspects and Regional Updates


The agenda was adopted as presented. The objective of the meeting was to tackle the topic on **outbreak management**: reflecting on national capability and capacity for ASF outbreak response, financial incentives, compensation, risk communication and post-outbreak recovery.

The meeting was reminded of the minutes of the SGE III meeting that deliberated biosecurity in the different value chains and surveillance at the field and laboratory levels. This was followed by a consolidated report of the degree of action taken by Members, based on the agreed action points. The highlights of the presentation reminded the meeting of the presence of the warhog-tick-sylvatic cycle makes eradication a non-realistic goal in such areas. In addition, cross-border pig trade and transport remain important factors for ASFV transmission, hence the need for bilateral and regional collaboration. On the aspect of surveillance, early warning systems, community level surveillance including at markets, transportation and along the value chain was emphasised. Members were reminded to increase investments that enhance submission of samples to the laboratories for confirmation, especially in times of strong suspicions of ASF outbreaks, and capacity building of staff, including in molecular diagnosis, with the support of Reference Laboratories.

There was unfortunately minimal contribution by Members on the progress of action points on biosecurity and surveillance. The report included feedback from South Africa and Uganda only. In summary, Veterinary Services with support of partners in some countries continued to raise awareness and training for stakeholders on biosecurity guided by available online resources. While appropriate legislation to apply biosecurity and surveillance activities may be in place, enforcement remains a challenge. Application of biosecurity, for example: safe housing and feed, may be unaffordable for smaller commercial operations, the proliferation of which nevertheless contributes to local and national food security. Supporting and integrating smaller producers into a bio-secure value chain driven by the required abattoir hygiene seems the most promising approach, with active support from the commercial pig industry organisation where feasible. Compartmentalisation is at an advanced stage of implementation in South Africa (116 registered compartments). This also supports certification for other diseases like CSF (RSA is free), PRRS, cysticercosis and FMD. Training activities reported included the WOAHA supported week-long practical training on advanced diagnosis and molecular sequencing, conducted by ARC-OVRI in August/September 2023 for seven national reference laboratories (Botswana, Benin, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania). The regional strategy for ASF was validated by the CVOs during the regional CVO meeting held in May 2024 at AU-IBAR, in Nairobi, Kenya.

The presentation on the outcomes of the ASF *Global Coordination Committee* (GCC) held at the sidelines of the WOAHA General Session in May 2024, didn't elicit much reaction. It reflected the Africa position that generally accepts that living with ASF in some subpopulations, with exploration of strategies to limit spread for business continuity remains the most feasible aspiration in the near term (3-5 years). This includes application of effective measures to limit spread, alternatives for zoning and compartmentalisation and public-private partnerships.

The presentation by the World Animal Health Information and Analysis Department of WOA



shows that the disease remains endemic and widely distributed in Africa but largely under-reported. In a few countries, ASF continues to spread to new, neighbouring countries and new administrative divisions in affected countries as shown by the map 1 (on the left). According to the report, ASF was reported in Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, South Africa, and Zambia as a first occurrence in a zone or compartment or as a situation of recurrence of an eradicated disease between 2022-2024. This is partly corroborated in the [ASF Situation Report no 57 by WOA](#).

Map 1: Update on African swine fever in the region (2022 – 2024) based on WAHIS database (Source: G. Bazimo WAHIAD, WOA)





Figure 1: New ASF Outbreaks reported since 2022 based on WAHIS database (Source: G. Bazimo WAHIAD, WOA)

The issue of vaccination came up. The meeting confirmed it was not aware of any use or importation of vaccines in Africa but expressed the need to check if there is any country that has initiated studies or registration of ASF vaccines. AU-PANVAC notified the meeting they had never received any ASF vaccines for quality control.

Map 2 shows the ASFV genotypes circulating in the region. Though with more data for the Southern Africa region, the map shows that all ASFV genotypes are circulating in the region, except XXIII which has only been described in Ethiopia. The array of genotypes circulating in Africa complicates the potential use of future vaccines as there seems to be no known cross-protection across genotypes.

The epidemiology of ASFV in the Republic of South Africa is very dynamic, with the warthog – tick (sylvatic) cycle no longer limited to the previously controlled area of South Africa. Pig related outbreaks have occurred in all nine provinces of the Republic, caused by genotypes I and II viruses and not traceable to warthogs.



Map 2: ASFV genotypes, circulating in Africa. Source : Njau, Emma P., et al. "African swine fever virus (ASFV) : Biology, genomics and genotypes circulating in sub-Saharan Africa." *Viruses* 13.11 (2021): 2285.

The presentation on behalf of the SADC *Epidemiology and Informatic Subcommittee* (EIS) of the *Livestock Technical Committee* (LTC) acknowledged that eradication is only a realistic goal in countries without wild suids or tick involvement. In the SADC sub-region, ASF has been reported in 10 out of 15 countries with outbreaks mainly associated with trade in pigs and pig products. Mauritius regained freedom from ASF in 2019. Eswatini and Lesotho have never reported ASF whereas Malawi typed virus P72 Genotype II (2019). In recent years, the disease has been reported outside the known endemic zones in South Africa. The increasing domestic pig outbreaks in South Africa pose a risk to previously uninfected countries (specifically Eswatini and Lesotho), hence the need for these countries to improve their risk assessments and *emergency preparedness plans* (EPP). Tanzania has developed a national control strategy with emphasis on

biosecurity. The plan for a sub-regional action plan based on national studies has not yet materialized.

The meeting noted the importance of the cross-border pig-trade as important in ASFV transmission and therefore the need to enhance bilateral and regional collaboration and coordination.

Session 3. Principles and innovations to strengthen capacities for outbreak management at national level

The topic on *General principles of outbreak management* as presented by WOAHA elaborated on epidemiological investigations in relation to ASFV source tracing (incidence of disease), tracing the spread (prevalence of the disease) and risk factors that enable exposure to the virus (how/why were the animals exposed to the disease). The investigation process was further described in figure 2 below. The presentation reminded the audience of the importance of national and international notifications and of resource mobilisation to support response plans that incorporate risk communication and community engagement. The relevant chapters of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code that can support decisions on outbreak management include Chapters:

- 1.4: Animal health surveillance,
- 1.5: Surveillance for arthropod vectors of animal diseases,
- 4.1: Introduction to recommendations for the prevention and control of transmissible animal diseases,
- 4.2: General principles on identification and traceability of live animals,
- 4.3: Design and implementation of identification systems to achieve animal traceability,
- 4.4: Zoning and compartmentalization,
- 4.13: Disposal of dead animals,
- 4.14: General recommendations on disinfection and disinsection,
- 4.16: Hygiene precautions, identification, blood sampling and vaccination and
- 4.19: Official control programmes for listed and emerging diseases.

The discussion on principles and innovations for managing ASF under different production systems covered aspects of depopulation through partial culling¹, disposal and decontamination, enforcement of quarantine and movement control within defined

¹ **Partial culling** is the removal of only infected herds or barns and tightening biosecurity in unaffected barns, sites and neighbouring premises as experimented in low- and middle-income countries where no compensation was available (experience of commercial and mega farms in China, called 'tooth extraction'; some commercial farms in Vietnam confirmed its efficacy; experiences from Ghana, Mauritius, South Africa). This implies isolating and culling only affected animals to minimize financial losses, avoid livelihood destruction and address carcass disposal problems. It has also been termed as 'Modified stamping out' (unpublished examples of cases in Benin and Togo). The success of partial culling is based on rapid detection, removal and destruction of infected pigs.

epidemiological areas, options for financial incentives and the importance of risk communication. The argument advanced was that depopulation through stamping out has had negative effects on peoples' welfare, pig welfare and the environment. It has traumatised pig farmers, from high bio-secure level compartments to family-level backyard farmers, whose pigs were 'like our children', contributing to resentment and mistrust by farmers when pigs are culled with no compensation, resulting in lack of reporting and illegal movement of pigs and pork.



Figure 2: Description of epidemiological investigation process (Source: Dan Donachie Preparedness and Resilience Department, WOAH)

In addition, in Haiti, it may well have led to the extinction of a breed of pigs that enabled low input pig production, over and above the wastage of edible protein on continents where an unacceptable number of children suffer stunting due to animal protein deprivation in the early years of their development. This is not to forget the challenges for disposal of vast numbers of carcasses on large and mega farms.

Practical examples of the negative impacts of mass culling and blanket restrictions were given, i.e.:

- All the pigs in isolated and bio-secure premises belonging to women, supported by an upliftment project, were killed;
- In an isolated, unaffected, very poor village, all confined pigs were killed but the scavenging pigs could not be captured and were the only survivors.

Therefore, less destructive but nevertheless effective measures are increasingly being tested and implemented. This includes partial culling also referred to as modified stamping out or targeted culling, with movement restrictions limited to the affected epidemiological unit (farm, village) or any reasonable radius around the infected focus, composting of both waste and carcasses, cleaning and disinfection through washing with water and a detergent that destroys 99% of pathogens, as well as stakeholder and community engagement to ensure both feasibility of (and compliance with) the measures. The cleaned premises should be allowed to dry before

disinfection. For pig pens with earthen floors, visibly contaminated soil should be removed and pens disinfected with a product that is effective in the presence of organic matter, for example caustic soda (1-2%). The alternative is exposure to strong sunlight which will rapidly destroy the virus. Studies have shown that no viable ASF virus is present after 3-5 days of composting both waste and carcasses, although viral DNA could be detected for much longer. The experts stated that low-cost movement control can be achieved by setting up checkpoints on roads, using local authorities, or engaging community members to monitor movement.

Members were encouraged that (when funds are available), market-related compensation can be a strong incentive for cooperation with outbreak control measures, knowing that financial compensation is not always the best solution. Alternatives to market-related compensation such as insurance schemes have had variable success and still require funds for implementation. A case in point pertains to Mauritian pig farmers, who were offered soft loans to restart, but these loans were rejected because farmers feared they would be unable to pay them back. The two presentations on the topics of principles and innovations for managing ASF and modified stamping out reported the same, i.e. that many farmers indicated that support with replacement stock and feed would be a better option, as money from compensation is often spent on short-term needs and is no longer available for restocking by the time the pens are released. The package could include training in sustainable and bio-secure pig production practices, and resilience-building.

Lessons can be learned from Vietnam's outbreaks that were caused by highly virulent ASFV p72 genotype II. The first outbreak was reported on 1 February 2019, and after 7 months, outbreaks were reported in all the 63 provinces in Vietnam, with subsequent outbreaks in 2022. In response at least 6 million pigs were culled. Upon conducting full genome sequencing, ASFV strains of p72 genotype I & II were confirmed in domestic pigs in 2023, which was also highly virulent. The low virulent gene deleting ASFV strain that causes chronic disease has also been detected in Vietnam. The Government has put in place control measures that include implementation of strict biosecurity measures, early detection, partial culling, movement control, public awareness, carcass disposal management, a vaccination programme and financial support/compensation. The two currently licensed ASF vaccines do not provide protection against recombinant ASFV strains. Overall, Vietnam has learned that *external* biosecurity is a key factor in protecting pig farms from ASF infection. Early detection and *internal* biosecurity are the most critical elements in preventing the spread of ASF on farms and ensuring success in testing and pig removal.

The topic on *Risk communication and behaviour change* was covered through the presentation of tools to allow mutual understanding of what constitutes risk, manage public perceptions and guide protective actions during ASF outbreaks. In practice, the challenges with risk communication are how to address misinformation, mistrust and cultural barriers. Behaviour change should target specific actions at individual, community and organisational levels, utilising applicable change models, such as theory of planned behaviour that factors motivation (what's in it for stakeholders and impact) or theory of change looking at risk, causes and process. The strategy should incorporate targeted messaging using various means like social media/mobile platforms, workshops for outreach, engaging community leaders and influencers (respected community leaders/gate keepers) targeting different value chain actors.



Credits for the FAO instructional video on Community ASF Biosecurity Interventions (CABS), available on YouTube : https://youtu.be/0B0rbRkpk_cto

The communication should be tailored to various audience: farmers, veterinarians, transporters, traders, feed suppliers, etc. Simplified visual messages have proven very effective in risk communication.





Figure 3: Envisaged Role of Stakeholders in preventing ASF (Source: Dan Donachie Preparedness and Resilience Department, WOAH)

Session 4: Strengthen capacities for outbreak management ■ Updates on national ASF preparedness and response programmes

The Member(s) Country/States presentations covered the national ASF situation and measures in place to manage outbreaks when they occur. The authorities in **South Africa** have outlined a series of measures to be followed in case of suspicion of ASF cases. This include imposing quarantine, prohibit movements, a system for reporting on further morbidity/mortality, disposal of diseased animals with compulsory destruction of contact pigs (culling). This is combined with full backward tracing (15 days prior to disease outbreak) by state veterinarians. The aspects of biosecurity, movement control, disinfection of premises, surveillance and requirements for lifting quarantine on a case-by-case basis is followed up at community and municipality level. The ASF National strategy is expected to be finalised in 2024 and incorporates aspects of inter-departmental cooperation to ensure safe disposal, implementation of biosecurity and culling.

The management of unconfined pigs, mainly in informal settlements, group of pigs owned by different farmers, feeding of swill/food waste, pigs kept under extensive production systems and general enforcement of regulations remain a challenge. The number of pigs in informal settlements or in odd places like garages has increased in recent years, coupled with uncontrolled transportation.

The aspect of transportation as a major factor in ASFV transmission was echoed by **Cameroon** and is elaborated in Map 3 below. The country has a strategic plan implemented through an operational plan. There are *Standard Operating Procedures* (SOPs) that guide surveillance and screening. In case of suspicion, mobile teams are mobilised to the affected site, followed by rapid dissemination of information, sample submission to the labs and diagnosis provided within two days as well as control expected within 10 days.



Map 3: Role of transport in the circulation of the ASF virus (Biosecurity), 2021 (Source: Dr Garga Gonne, DSV & Dr Feussom K. Jean-Marc, SDPSE, Cameroon)

In Cameroon, an Infection Declaration Decree was signed on 16 April 2024. This Decree included movement control, closure of pig markets, sanitary slaughter, disinfection of areas (with support of mobile teams), sampling and monitoring pig farms, destruction and burning of pigs. Though stipulated in the laws, culling and restocking are a challenge due to the financial costs. Information sharing is done through the epidemio-surveillance networks of the sub-regions (ECCAS and ECOWAS).

The control efforts are no different in **Uganda** where outbreaks are reported and managed by field veterinarians under leadership of the district veterinarian. Samples are sent to the national veterinary investigation laboratory in Entebbe. The RT-PCR tests are used for confirmation which informs decisions such as quarantine, slaughter and enforcement of movement restrictions. Culling of infected pens or herds is difficult to implement as there is no direct compensation. Training of farmers on biosecurity is an ongoing activity with farmer platforms activated. Farmers are supported to source animals from districts that have been screened and deemed disease free. The development of a national ASF control strategy is ongoing. There is also ongoing research by ILRI for mobile slaughter abattoirs for pigs in hotspot districts, to minimize spread (through conventional abattoirs).

Two phases of disease management were discussed by **Togo**, encompassing an investigation phase and then control. The process involves identification of outbreak site, sample collection and confirmation, recording morbidity and mortality, census of affected pigs, resource mobilization to support slaughter and incineration of carcasses, enforcement of movement control, active surveillance and a three-month break (void) period before allowing restocking. Information sharing is also done via the ECOWAS sub-regional epidemio-surveillance network (and the national network, REMATO). A national system of surveillance on the One Health platform is operational at the ministerial level but is limited by low capacity of personnel at field level for data collection and analysis. The compensation to support culling is insufficient

compared to other diseases. For example, FCFA 550 million (USD 880,000) was spent for Avian flu (H1N1) reimbursed at FCFA 2,500/head for animals culled (USD 4.0). On the other hand, farmers are sometimes compensated at an average of FCFA 500 CFA (USD 8.0) per pig, if at all, to compensate in case of ASF; therefor producers do not notify and rather rush to sell their animals to avoid culling. The veterinary authorities are conducting advocacy to decision makers to encourage better compensation.

The review by Michel Dione (ILRI) demonstrates the need to understand the dynamics of ASF within communities and the risk factors of ASF spread along the pig value chain. This was illustrated with results from participatory epidemiological assessments conducted in Uganda which shows that the peak of ASF cases in those areas coincides with the occurrence of malnutrition cases. This was mapped along the seasonal calendar, informing the likely connection with movement patterns and feeding options.

Recommendations by value chain actors for better control of ASF and their perception of its applicability.					
Domain	Recommendation	Disease control	Ease of implementation	Cost-Effective	Timeline
Biosecurity	Farmers to construct fences around their farms	High	Medium	Low	Medium
	Use of disinfectant footbaths on farm	High	High	High	Short
	Restrict visitors on farm	High	Low ^a	Medium	Short
	Boiling of swill before feeding to pigs	High	Low ^b	Medium	Short
	Regular disinfection and cleaning of pig pens and farm structures	High	Low ^c	High	Short
	Have separate feeds formulation unit for mixing ingredients	Medium	High	High	Short
	Avoid recycling of feed bags	High	High	High	Short
	Observe quarantine during disease outbreak	High	Low	Low	Short
	Install police check points to control animal movement	High	Low	Low	Long
	Arrange training on bio-security measures	High	Medium	High	Short
Awareness	Launch a campaign against ASF (seminars, radio talk shows, posters)	High	Medium	Low	Short
	Put signposts with guidelines for visitors (farmers, veterinarians and traders) at gates of farms	High	High	High	Short
Communal breeding	Create parish information centres	High	Medium	High	Short
	Each farm should have its own boar	High	Low ^d	Low	Short
	Promote artificial insemination	High	Medium	Low	Medium
	Stop village boar service, especially during ASF outbreak	High	Medium	Low	Short
Collective action	Strengthen the existing farmer and trader associations for collective marketing	High	Medium ^e	Medium	Short
	Establishment of centralized slaughter places at parish level and abattoirs at district level	High	Low	Medium	Medium
Disease surveillance	Establishment of village biosecurity teams.	High	High	High	Short
	Develop rapid diagnostic kits for ASF	High	Medium	Low	Medium
	Put in place and enforce pig by-laws (e.g ban sell of meat from dead animals; control illegal movement; guidelines for buyers and vets)	High	Low	High	Short
	Campaign to control stray dogs	High	High	High	medium
	Regulation of enforcement on input service providers (drugs and feeds)	High	Low	Medium	Short

Table 2: Recommendations by value chain actors for control of ASF and perceptions on applicability (Source: Michel Dione, Dakar-Senegal, ILRI)

- This could be low considering beliefs and social norms.
- It has an associated cost of fuel and labour.
- The cost may limit its implementation.
- The majority of farmers have fewer than three pigs, so they would not invest in having their own boar because of lack of high cost of maintenance.
- There is lack of trust among group

Value chain actors were further engaged to define the possible incentive for behavioural change. The output was that fear of losing business and income and lack of knowledge were the main reasons why farmers were not complying with outbreak management measures. The study further co-created and contextualised cost-effective solutions with actors and stakeholders to gather their perceptions on their applicability as show in table on the previous page.

The solutions that were favoured were related to implementation of biosecurity measures such as the use of a disinfectant footbath at farm entrance, feed management, training, fencing, awareness creation supported by signposts with guidelines for visitors, establishment of village biosecurity teams, strengthening of farmer and trader associations for collective marketing and campaigns against ASF, including of the control of stray dogs.

Overall, there seems to be a need for capacity building to encourage uptake of better pig production practices, incentives for the implementation of these agreed practices by the different actors involved in the value chain, and incorporating relevant infrastructure to support uptake. An outbreak always comes as a shock, hence the need for community support and stakeholder engagement to ensure both feasibility of (and compliance with) the directed sanitary measures that are imposed. There is need for continuous awareness and sensitisation of value chain actors to adopt recommendations related to movement restrictions, biosecurity, awareness, communal breeding (i.e. the practice of renting of boars), collective action, disease surveillance, among others.

Some countries have laws in place to support outbreak management, but implementation and enforcement remain a challenge, partly attributed to limitations with financing, skilled personnel, low facilitation for field investigation, sample collection, diagnosis, response and support for livelihood recovery (disinfection, restocking, feeds). In addition, the cross-border interactions in some areas should be considered, necessitating a regional approach to ASF control for management of ASF and other TADs diseases.

In respect of Members' experiences in putting measures in place to support preparedness and response in cases of an ASF outbreak, there has been progress in **Kenya** that recently finalized the national strategy for the control of ASF (2021 - 2026), and borrows from regional, continental and global strategies and standards. The country is implementing part of it but is limited by financial constraints. There are two central laboratories in Kabete, west of Nairobi i.e. CVL (national) and ILRI (international) that have capacity for ASF diagnosis. There are six regional labs that can support sample collection, processing and submission. The Kenya Animal Bio-Surveillance System (KABS) provides real time data on the disease situation, gathered by sub-county veterinary officers.

The aspect of compartmentalization for control of diseases was considered during the development of Kenya's national strategy for ASF control, potentially viable for private sector investment. In addition, a risk communication and control strategy (2024 – 2028) has been developed along the pig value chain to strengthen, communicate and advocate for policy change. It was clarified that this was a collaborative effort with involvement of stakeholders at grassroots' level. Some of the outputs include *Information, Education and Communication* (IEC) materials in English and Kiswahili languages, planned to be rolled out via radio messages, brochures and other means. The challenges that need attention include the over reliance on feeding swill (hotel leftovers), uncontrolled illegal movement, porous borders with illegal importation of pigs, weak early detection, free movement and mingling of warthogs, other wild and domestic pigs, limited capacity to enforce quarantine under the devolved governance structure (entrusted to the counties), poor biosecurity at points of slaughter and during transportation, lack of compensation by the government. The vision for the veterinary authority (the Directorate of Veterinary Services, DVS) is to engage in resource mobilisation to support implementation of the strategies and development of a contingency plan targeting free areas. The need for a sub-

regional strategy to manage sharing of epidemiological information, coordination and cooperation in disease control was again revisited in this session.

The outbreaks that occurred in **Cape Verde** in 1998 (Santiago and Maio islands), 2000 (Santiago), 2011 (Fogo) and 2015 (Boa vista and Santiago) was mainly attributed to pig movement between islands, poor biosecurity conditions and management practices. The outbreak management involved the following: notification supported by protocols for immediate reporting of suspected cases, safe disposal of infected pigs with use of controlled burial, disinfection of contaminated areas, strengthening active and passive surveillance for early detection, monitoring outbreaks, imposition of containment zones, restricted movement of pigs and pig products through a decree (no 15/2014 and 23/2015), education and awareness campaigns with farmers and communities. The national authorities faced challenges to reach rural (hard to reach) regions, lacked diagnostic reagents, protocols for disposal of carcasses and waste, sanitary slaughter. Compensation of pig farmers was not supported. A national strategy for control of ASF is still not developed.

A similar concern of lack of laboratory reagents and no allocation of resources to support compensation and control was expressed by the **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)**. The laboratories are reactive but mostly lacking reagents and limited by weak capacity of field staff to collect samples. In quarter one of 2024, about 8,000 pigs were suspected to be infected (symptomatic diagnosis) in 16 out of the 26 provinces. There is weak and delayed implementation of control measures. The national authorities have sensitized farmers on enforcement of biosecurity measures to manage the spread of disease.

The experience of **Cote d'Ivoire** whose authorities supported compensation through the farmer association, *Interprofession porcine de Côte d'Ivoire*, abbreviated as *Interporci* was shared. The decision on compensation was supported by a Government Decree, 2022-352 June (articles 3 and 4) on compensation after stamping out in infected areas. These specific conditions were not always followed. In case of an outbreak, Government is informed of the number of animals culled by category, followed by validation by *Interporci* on total amounts to be paid and confirmation of the list of beneficiaries. The national veterinary authority, with complete supporting documents, then proceeds to make a submission to the Ministry of Finance to enable the process of payment via bank transfer directly to beneficiaries.

Still in Cote d'Ivoire, the activity of restocking should be implemented within 8 months and is supported by the Ministerial Decree nr 013/MIRAH/CAB of 10 May 2019. The rule on restocking was not always followed, except for a joint project partly supported by an FAO/TCP that mobilised pigs for restocking in Tchologo and Poro districts. Each beneficiary received 5 pigs (4 sows and 1 boar) averaging 30 – 40 kgs, 10 to 15 bags of animal feeds (50 kg per bag), disinfection kits/materials, sensitisation materials and stationery. In total 125 beneficiaries received 875 pigs. The Veterinary Services were pre-financed by the Veterinary Department using government budget. Socio-economic studies estimate that FCFA 3 billion (USD 4.8 million) was used between 2017 and 2024. All outbreaks were recorded and the impact of ASF was analysed and integrated into the strategy. The challenges to mobilise resources makes these activities difficult to implement, consequently leading to discussions about sustainability and calls for other non-financial support mechanisms. The practice of biosecurity should be emphasised and maintained throughout restocking. The country is considering more sustainable models such as developing a model that groups farmers at cooperative level to encourage uptake of better pig production practices, support for culling and restocking.

The expert opinion on promoting evidence based ASF control policies supported the premise that control measures should be risk based informed by epidemiological studies, types of production system and context with a focus on prevention and supporting business continuity. The expert challenged Member(s) Countries/States to exploit the favourable characteristics of ASF when making management decisions which include the ability to slow the spread to minimise the number of pigs infected, lack of airborne transmission over long distances and short survival of infectivity in the environment when not protected by durable organic material. All these may enable earlier restocking. In addition, the aspect of promoting affordable, implementable and culturally acceptable biosecurity measures, coupled with risk management, was stressed. Members were reminded that radical decisions such as a ban on swill feeding will be ignored if there is no affordable alternative. However, encouraging boiling of feed waste for 5-10 minutes may be more acceptable to smallholders. It is important to reduce financial losses due to unnecessary restrictive control measures by using evidence (infected epidemiological units, risk-based) to define containment areas and pigs to be culled. In addition, Members should identify practical and acceptable alternatives to monetary compensation which could include support for restocking, use of sentinel pigs to confirm safety of premises, supply of core-breeding stock, among others. Participatory approaches and stakeholder communication engagement are key for success of prevention and control measures. Vaccination is not yet an option for the region considering concerns raised with live attenuated vaccines, increased virulence at field level and development of chronic infections. There is certainly need for more evidence on vaccines.

The presentation by the Designated Expert of the WOA Reference Laboratory, ARC-OVRI, on promoting effective surveillance and diagnostics elaborated on the currently available diagnostic tools, how they could be used in the field, examples of their application and documented [protocols](#) for further guidance. He informed the meeting that the Reference Laboratory has a stockpile of diagnostic reagents that can be made available at request of the WOA Delegates/CVOs.




Figure 4: Progression of ASFV infection to guide decisions on use of the various diagnostic tests (Source: Livio Heath, ARC-OVRI, South Africa)

These are estimated to be about 500 diagnostic assays, which include RT-PCR, Lateral Flow Devices and ELISA kits, that can be shipped on request. The support will depend on laboratory capacity of Member(s) Countries/States. He further clarified that only 3 Member(s) Countries/States can be supported at short notice.

The discussion that followed during the plenary was related to who takes responsibility for the costs of diagnosis as this is out-of-reach for most smallholder farmers. At national level, the actual cost associated with diagnostics is one of the major hindrances to reporting. For example, the PCR may cost up to USD 60; a farmer who sells an adult pig for approximately USD 60 - 100 may therefore be unwilling to pay for such a test if he previously lost pigs due to the diagnosis (s)he paid for. The National veterinary services were urged to progressively make efforts to take over the cost of testing, at minimum cost for the smallholder farms. There are no *Point of Care* (PoC) tests validated to WOAHA standards. However, there is ongoing work by the Biological Standards Commission on guidelines to validate such tests.

The language-based group discussion was turned to a plenary session due to time constraints. The conversation aimed to examine incentives for compliance to outbreak management policies. Ultimately farmers are interested in restocking and ideally this should be supported fairly soon. Establishing and strengthening farmer groups to lobby for support in restocking and supportive policies for access to markets, biosecurity enhancement (among other issues) could be prioritised. Where there is no financial compensation, soft or interest free loans can be considered, though in some areas like e.g. in Mauritius this was not accepted either. Where compensation is done, it should be facilitated in time to support restocking. Improved market access can be an effective incentive for disease control and should be encouraged. This could be considered through a public-private partnership arrangement like in the experience of Cote d'Ivoire, in order to support farmers in prevention and recovery.

In summary, there was significant interest around the adoption of compensation by some Members and how this was applied to ensure compliance. Nevertheless, Members, equally wary of the limitations of financing and its sustainability in effective disease control, looked at further considerations for market driven, non-cash incentives. Zoning is not felt to be particularly practical for implementation considering large terrestrial borders. Compartmentalisation is seen as a more practical tool for disease control with better feasibility as this could be applied by the private sector. Some countries have developed control strategies and policies, but the challenge remains with implementation and enforcement of policies at national level to support early detection and outbreak management.

Session 5. Final deliberations, action points, next meeting

In the end, the meeting agreed on a number of action points, that were eventually circulated to all Member Countries for validation.

Conclusions and action points:

1. Technical partners including AU-IBAR, FAO and WOAHA to support Member(s) Countries/States improve their capacity for early detection of ASF so as to contribute towards timely reporting and response to reduce impact of ASF disease outbreaks;
2. Members to enhance surveillance and timely collection and submission of samples from the field for laboratory diagnosis of ASFV and other priority pig/swine diseases;
3. AU-IBAR and The Regional Economic Communities to enhance their support in capacity building, implementation of national strategic and operational plans, while enhancing cross border collaboration and harmonisation for early detection, management and post-ASF outbreak recovery;
4. The selected Regional Economic Communities (ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC) to facilitate the functions of the epidemiology and laboratory networks to enhance coordination in the sub-region for better preparedness and response to ASF outbreaks;
5. Member(s) Countries/States to review and adapt the existing tools and guidelines to support evidence-based development and implementation of national response plans. This includes incorporating risk communication, effective surveillance, partial culling/modified stamping out, disinfection, disposal and post-outbreak recovery programmes;
6. Member(s) Countries/States to implement less destructive but effective measures that are increasingly being tested such as partial culling combined with movement restrictions within defined boundaries and safe carcass disposal;
7. Member(s) Countries/States to encourage communities' and stakeholders' compliance to outbreak management through improved communication and enforcement of quarantine and movement control on infected premises at the start of an outbreak. This should be accompanied by rapid trace-back and trace-forward investigation to determine the extent of the outbreak and response to reduce its impact. The restrictions should target affected epidemiological units and within reasonable radius so as not to unfairly financially disadvantage unaffected bio secure premises;
8. Member(s) Countries/States with support of RECs, AU-IBAR, FAO and WOAHA to strategically communicate risks and risk mitigation measures as part of emergency preparedness to policy makers to influence development or review of evidence-based supportive legislation and financing of its implementation. Communication resources are available here (Trello);
9. Member(s) Countries/States with support of RECs, AU-IBAR, FAO, ILRI, WOAHA and (other) researchers to generate evidence to inform and contextualize field level decisions for effective preparedness, early detection, and outbreak management. This could be done by conducting participatory epidemiological and socio-economic assessments involving value chain actors to understand local dynamics and risk factors contributing to ASFV

spread within specific geographic areas, e.g. seasonality, animal movement, feeding patterns, community needs etc, that inform patterns/cycle of ASF disease spread;

10. Member(s) Countries/States in consultation with the WOAHA Reference Laboratory for ASF in Africa (ARC-OVRI in South Africa) in collaboration with AU-PANVAC to proactively review their gaps in ASFV diagnosis and develop a plan for capacity development, including for the use of Point of Care (PoC) kits in emergency preparedness and membership to the network;
11. Member(s) Countries/States to take note of the conditional support provided by the Reference Laboratory for ASF in Africa (ARC-OVRI) for access to a stockpile of diagnostic reagents which can be activated on request by Members.

Recommendations to amendments of the terms of reference (ToR)

The Regional Steering Committee of GF-TADs for Africa which was scheduled to be held before this meeting was eventually postponed and hence the recommendations from the third meeting of the Standing Group of Experts for ASF were maintained.

Membership:

The meeting agreed on several *recommendations* to amend the *terms of reference* (ToR), which include the co-opting of both Cabo Verde and Mali to be SGE Members and the substitution of LANAVET, Cameroon, which has not attended any of the four meetings to date, by another regional service laboratory, potentially Botswana, preferably from the southern Africa region (all these amendments require the *validation* by the RSC).



The next meeting will be communicated as soon as funding is available. Schedule and venue will be communicated by the organising team (AU-IBAR, FAO, WOAHA) in due course. The agenda of the next meeting will be **vaccines and vaccination**.

Closing session

Due to time constraints, short closing remarks were provided by WOAHA Regional Representative Karim Tounkara, who thanked all participants, interpreters and contributors for making the meeting a success.

The present report has been added to the dedicated SGE page on the GF-TADs for Africa website in order to facilitate the sharing of information amongst Members of the SGE (click the link) : [African Swine Fever - Standing Group of Experts \(SGE\)](#)

Annex 1. List of participants



Screen capture of some of the participants in the virtual meeting

Rank	First name(s)	SURNAME	Position	Department / Division	Institution	City, town	Country
1	Bouda	AHMADI	Secretary	GF-TADs Global Secretariat	Food and Agriculture Organization	Rome	Italy
2	Owoningbin	AKAKPO-ISSOLA	Chef de Division de la Santé animale et Laboratoires	Direction de l'Elevage	Ministère de l'agriculture, de l'élevage et du développement rural	Lomé	Togo
3	Patrick	BASTIAENSEN	Programme Officer	Sub-Regional Representation for Eastern Africa	World Organisation for Animal Health	Nairobi	Kenya
4	Charles Sanne	BODJO	Ag. Director	AU-PANVAC	African Union Commission	Bishoftu	Ethiopia
5	Hiver	BOUSSINI	Senior Animal Health Officer	AU-IBAR	African Union Commission	Nairobi	Kenya
6	Domingo	CARO III	Development Communications, Risk Communication, Stakeholder Engagement	Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific	Food and Agriculture Organization	Bangkok	Thailand
7	Viola	CHEMIS	Regional Programmes Coordinator	Regional Activities Department	World Organisation for Animal Health	Nairobi	Kenya
8	Charmaine W.	CHNG	Deputy Head	Science Department	World Organisation for Animal Health	Paris	France
9	Alicia	CLOETE	State Veterinarian	Department of Animal Health	Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development	Pretoria	South Africa
10	Emmanuel	COUACY-HYMANN	Head of LIRED	Livestock	CNRA	Abidjan	Cote d'Ivoire
11	Michel Mainack	DIONE	Senior Scientist, Animal Health	Animal and Human Health	ILRI	Dakar	Senegal
12	Mame Nahe	DIOUF	Directrice	Laboratoire National de l'Elevage et des Recherches Vétérinaires	Institut Sénégalais de Recherches Agricoles (ISRA)	Dakar	Senegal
13	Xolani Roland	DLAMINI	Director of Veterinary and Livestock Services	Veterinary and Livestock Services	Ministry of Agriculture	Mbabane	Eswatini
14	Folorunso	FASINA	Early Warning and One Health Intelligence Expert	NSAH	Food and Agriculture Organisation	Rome	Italy
15	Jean-Marc	FEUSSOM KAMENI	Sous-Directeur de la Protection Sanitaire et de l'Epidémiologie-surveillance	Direction des Services Vétérinaires	Ministère de l'Elevage, des Pêches et des Industries Animales	Yaounde	Cameroon
16	Viviene	GONCALVES	Veterinarian	Direção dos Serviços de Pecuaria e Saúde Animal	Ministério de Agricultura e Ambiente	Praia	Cabo Verde
17	Garga	GONNE	Directeur	Direction des Services Vétérinaires	MINEPIA	Yaounde	Cameroon
18	Livio	HEATH	Research Team Manager	Transboundary Animal Diseases	ARC-Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute	Pretoria	South Africa
19	Ayuba Sini	IBRAHIM	Deputy Director	Federal Department of Veterinary and Pest Control Services	Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development	Abuja	Nigeria
20	Bitrus	INUWA	Researcher		National Veterinary Research Institute, Vom	Jos	Nigeria
21	Leana	JANSE VAN RENSBURG	State veterinarian	Western Cape Veterinary Services		George	South Africa

22	Vessaly	KALLO	Directeur	Direction des Services Veterinaires	Ministère des Ressources Animales et Halieutiques.	Abidjan	Cote d'Ivoire
23	Dominic Lokeris	KATHIYA	Livestock and Rangeland Development Officer	IGAD Center for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development (ICPALD)	Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD)	Nairobi	Kenya
24	Matthew	KENYANJUI	Senior Consultant	Kenya Country Office	Food and Agriculture Organisation	Nairobi	Kenya
25	Eugene	KOFFI	Programme Officer	Regional Animal Health Centre	ECOWAS – RAHC-WA	Bamako	Mali
26	Charles Euloge	LAMIEN	Technical Officer	Joint FAO/IAEA Center	International Atomic Energy Agency	Vienna	Austria
27	Pam	LUKA	Chief Veterinary Research Officer	Biotechnology Centre	National Veterinary Research Institute, Vom	Jos	Nigeria
28	Paul Johnson	LUMU	ASF National coordinator / Snr Veterinary Officer	Epidemiology, disease surveillance, and investigation	Ministry of Agriculture Animal industry and Fisheries	Kampala	Uganda
29	Roger Mponda	MADIAMBA	Chef de Division de Santé animale	Direction des Services Vétérinaires	Ministère de Pêche et Elevage	Kinshasa	Congo (Dem. Rep.)
30	Néo	MAPITSE	Sub-Regional Representative	WOAH Eastern Africa Representation	World Organisation for Animal Health	Nairobi	Kenya
31	Charles	MASEMBE	Professor	COVAB	Makerere University	Kampala	Uganda
32	Sihle	MDLULI	Chair of the SADC LTC EISc	Department of Veterinary Services	Ministry of Agriculture	Manzini	Eswatini
33	Yuka	MORIBE	Programme Officer	WAHIAD	World Organisation for Animal Health	Paris	France
34	Geoffrey Gitau	MUKORA		Directorate of Veterinary Services	State Department of Livestock	Nairobi	Kenya
35	Theophilus	ODOOM	Head	Accra Veterinary Laboratory	Veterinary Services Directorate	Accra	Ghana
36	Karima	OUALI	Animal Health Officer	NSAH	Food and Agriculture Organization	Rome	Italy
37	Douyeri Thierry	OUATTARA	Chef de Service de la Surveillance et de la Riposte	Direction des Services Veterinaires	Ministère des Ressources Animales et Halieutiques.	Abidjan	Cote d'Ivoire
38	Bouzabo	PATCHILI	Coordinator	Regional Animal Health Centre	ECCAS – RAHC-CA	N'Djamena	Chad
39	Mary Louise	PENRITH	Extraordinary Professor	Department of Veterinary Tropical Diseases, Faculty of Veterinary Science	University of Pretoria	Pretoria	South Africa
40	Analina	PEREIRA	Director(a)	Direção dos Serviços de Pecuária e Saúde Animal	Ministério de Agricultura e Ambiente	Praia	Cabo Verde
41	Andriy	ROZSTALNYI	Animal Health Officer	NSAH	Food and Agriculture Organization	Rome	Italy
42	Huyam	SALIH	Director	AU-IBAR	African Union Commission	Nairobi	Kenya
43	Mohammed	SHAMSUDDIN	Senior Regional Animal Production and Health Officer	Regional Office for Africa (RAP)	Food and Agriculture Organisation	Accra	Ghana
44	Karim	TOUNKARA	Regional Representative	Regional Representation for Africa	World Organisation for Animal Health	Bamako	Mali
45	Basilio	VALDEHUESA	Communication Officer	Regional Representation for Asia	World Organisation for Animal Health	Tokyo	Japan
46	Le	VAN PHAN	Associate Professor	College of Veterinary Medicine	Vietnam National University of Agriculture (VNUA)	Hanoi	Vietnam

Annex 2. Resources : international reference laboratories (WOAH) for African swine fever

Dr David Williams

AUSTRALIA

CSIRO Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness
5 Portarlington Road, Geelong, Victoria 3220

+61 52.27.50.00
d.williams@csiro.au

Dr Aruna Ambagala

CANADA

National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease,
Canadian Food Inspection Agency
1015 Arlington Street, Winnipeg,

Manitoba R3E 3M4
+1-204.789.20.89
aruna.ambagala@inspection.gc.ca
aruna.ambagala@canada.ca

Dr Zhiliang Wang

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

National Surveillance and Research Center for
Exotic Animal Diseases
China Animal Health and Epidemiology Center,
369 Nanjing Road, Qingdao 266032

+86-532 85.63.91.66
zlwang111@163.com
wangzhiliang@cahec.cn

Dr Livio Heath

SOUTH AFRICA

Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute,
Agricultural Research Council,

Private Bag X05,
Onderstepoort 0110
+27-12 529.95.01
HeathL@arc.agric.za

Dr José Manuel Sánchez-Vizcaíno

SPAIN

Centro de Vigilancia Sanitaria Veterinaria
(VISAVET) Facultad de Veterinaria

HCV Planta sótano
Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)
Avda Puerta de Hierro s/n,
28040 Madrid
+34-91 394.40.82
jmvizcaino@ucm.es

Dr Linda Dixon

UNITED KINGDOM

Ash Road, Pirbright Woking, Surrey,

GU24 0NF Pirbright
+44-14.83.23.24.41
linda.dixon@pirbright.ac.uk

Dr. Ping Wu

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

USDA, APHIS, VS, NVSL,
Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory,
Plum Island Animal Disease Center, P.O. Box 848,
Greenport, NY 11944

+1-631.323.33.14
Ping.Wu@usda.gov

Annex 3. Resources : international reference centres (FAO) for African swine fever

[appointment pending]

Dr. Arshad Mather, acting

SOUTH AFRICA

Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute,
Agricultural Research Council,

Private Bag X05,

Onderstepoort 0110

+27-12 529.91.06

+27-12 529.95.01

MatherA@arc.agric.za

Annex 4. Resources : selected national reference laboratories for African swine fever (SGE Members)

Dr Maryam Muhammad

NIGERIA

National Veterinary Research Institute
(NVRI)

PMB 1 Vom

Plateau State

+234 90.58.77.77.64

+234 81.11.11.85.33

maryam.muhammad@nvri.gov.ng

maryam.muhammad42@gmail.com

pamluka08@gmail.com

Dr Mame Nahé Diouf (outgoing)

Dr Assane Gueye Fall (incoming)

SENEGAL

Laboratoire National de l'Elevage et de
Recherches Vétérinaires (LNERV)
Institut Sénégalais de la Recherche
Agricole (ISRA)

Rte du Front de Terre

Dakar-Hann

+221 832.36.79

mnahe.diouf@gmail.com

assane.fall@isra.sn

agueyefall@yahoo.fr

Annex 5. Resources : latest immediate notifications submitted to WAHIS (since 2018, in reverse chronological order) as of 31 December 2024.

18/04/2024 Cote d'Ivoire	12/05/2020 Namibia
18/08/2023 Cote d'Ivoire	11/05/2020 South Africa
02/08/2023 South Africa	12/02/2020 Sierra Leone
04/11/2022 Zambia	02/10/2019 Kenya
12/08/2022 South Africa	01/10/2019 Cote D'Ivoire
31/03/2022 Zambia	11/09/2019 South Africa
17/05/2021 Côte d'Ivoire	23/08/2019 Zimbabwe
25/02/2021 South Africa	18/04/2019 South Africa
03/02/2021 Tanzania	09/04/2019 South Africa
21/01/2021 South Africa	14/02/2019 Zimbabwe
05/08/2020 Zambia	14/09/2018 Chad
17/06/2020 Nigeria	30/05/2018 South Africa

This event was organised under the auspices of



GF-TADs

GLOBAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
PROGRESSIVE CONTROL OF
TRANSBOUNDARY ANIMAL DISEASES



Food and Agriculture
Organization of the
United Nations



World Organisation
for Animal Health
Founded as OIE