



Rift Valley Fever:


risk of introduction
impact
prevention & control

Alessandro Broglia

Animal Health & Welfare – EFSA


Mosquito-borne
viral disease of
ruminants and humans

>> serious zoonosis



- ✓ **Aedes and Culex mosquitoes** (main vector species)
- ✓ transovarian (vertical) transmission
- ✓ inter epidemics period (5-15 years)
- ✓ Death or abortion of ruminants, high impact in young animals
- ✓ Humans infected with animals and animal products
- ✓ Expanding from Africa




Rift Valley Fever – expanding



Rift Valley Fever – seropositivity




Rift Valley Fever – Mayotte epidemics



Adoption of 3 scientific opinions from EFSA in 2020:

1. Epidemiological update and Risk of introduction into EU
2. Impact of epidemics in Mayotte
3. Effectiveness of prevention and control measures in Mayotte and EU in case of incursion


Methodology: Mint RISK model



Possible pathways of introduction to EU:

- ✓ infected animals: uncontrolled movements
- ✓ infected vectors: imported or active movement
- ✓ contaminated products : fresh products
- ✓ infected humans : dead-end hosts

Rift Valley Fever – risk of introduction





civil flights in 2016-2018 from countries that have reported RVF

By animal pathway: less than 0.002 epidemics/year (1 epidemic every 500 years, worst case scenario)

By vector pathway:






- Netherlands: 0.0044 epidemics/year >> 1 every 200 years
- Malta : 0.0025 epidemics/year >> 1 every 400 years
- Belgium and Greece: 0.0014 epidemics/year >> 1 every 700 years
- Much lower for other MSs

Rift Valley Fever – impact in Mayotte



- Diagnostic tests: RT PCR and ELISA
- Vaccines: live and inactivated
- Spread model to explore effectiveness of control measures
- Example of NL

Comparison of some control strategies considering one possible spread scenario



Probability of spread beyond a certain radius : surveillance zone size

Restriction zone		20 km		50 km		100 km	
		R0=2	R0=6	R0=2	R0=6	R0=2	R0=6
Mean vector dispersal	numbers of infected farms detected within the zone when implemented						
5 km	1	0.17	0.42	0.001	0.003	8.6×10^{-8}	2.6×10^{-7}
	10	0.84	1.0	0.01	0.03	8.6×10^{-7}	2.6×10^{-6}
10 km	1	0.56	0.91	0.08	0.22	0.001	0.003
	10	1.0	1.0	0.55	0.91	0.099	0.03

COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) 2020/687

ANNEX V

MINIMUM RADIUS OF PROTECTION AND SURVEILLANCE ZONES

(as referred to in Article 21 of this Regulation)

Indicated as radius of a circle centred on the establishment

Category A diseases	Protection Zone	Surveillance Zone
Foot and mouth disease	3 km	10 km
Infection with rinderpest virus	3 km	10 km
Infection with Rift Valley fever virus	20 km	50 km
Infection with lumpy skin disease virus	20 km	50 km
Infection with <i>Mycoplasma mycoides</i> subsp. <i>mycoides</i> SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia)	Establishment	3 km
Sheep pox and goat pox	3 km	10 km
Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus	3 km	10 km
Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia	Establishment	3 km
African horse sickness	100 km	150 km

Key points:

- In endemic areas control can be through vaccination
- In free areas: passive surveillance during vector season in risk areas of introduction
- Vaccines: need of DIVA
- Consider size of surveillance zone

Thanks for the attention!

Acknowledgements:

- EFSA Panel on animal health and welfare
- EFSA Working group on RVF
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- Ministry of Agriculture, Jordan
- CIRAD, France
- Coopadem Mayotte, France
- IRD-MIVEGEC, France
- GD Animal Health, NL
- Mayotte airport, France